

Is Vote-buying Effective? Evidence from a Field Experiment in West Africa

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Appendix – Additional results and robustness

The results in Tables A1 to A4 are referred in the footnotes of the paper. Table A5 refers to the correlations between vote-buying by candidates at the July 2006 presidential elections and vote-buying by the parties at the March 2006 parliamentary elections. One can show clear correlations between Fradique de Menezes and MDFM, and Patrice Trovoada and MLSTP/ADI. This supports comparability of vote-buying between the parliamentary elections and the presidential elections in the year of 2006.

Table A1a: Differences across panel-survey drops and remaining individuals

| | surveyed individuals | panel drops | difference |
|--------------------|-------------------------|-------------|------------------|
| | | | -2.849** |
| | | | (1.371) |
| | | | 0.042** |
| | | | -0.630*** |
| | | | (0.214) |
| | | | 0.010*** |
| | | | 0.049 |
| | | | (0.044) |
| | | | 0.254 |
| | | | -0.060 |
| | | | (0.045) |
| | | | 0.208 |
| | | | -0.015 |
| | | | (0.016) |
| | | | 0.386 |
| | | | 0.013 |
| basic demographics | | | (0.013) |
| | | | 0.304 |
| | | | 0.065 |
| | | | (0.048) |
| | | | 0.200 |
| | | | -0.259 |
| | | | (0.391) |
| | | | 0.502 |
| | | | -0.059 |
| | | | (0.047) |
| | | | 0.220 |
| | | | -0.029 |
| | | | (0.044) |
| | | | 0.520 |
| | | | -0.028 |
| | | | (0.041) |
| | | | 0.528 |
| | | | 0.018 |
| | | | (0.012) |
| | | | 0.146 |
| | | | -0.023*** |
| | | | (0.008) |
| | | | 0.008*** |
| | | | 0.073* |
| | | | (0.040) |
| | | | 0.108 |
| | | | -0.006 |
| | | | (0.028) |
| | | | 0.816 |
| | | | -0.030*** |
| | | | (0.011) |
| | | | 0.006*** |
| | | | -0.001 |
| | | | (0.041) |
| | | | 0.984 |
| | | | -0.013 |
| | | | (0.036) |
| | | | 0.752 |
| | | | 0.008 |
| | | | (0.022) |
| | | | 0.714 |

Note: Standard errors of the difference reported in parentheses; these are corrected by clustering at the location (census area) level. Wild bootstrap p-values shown below the standard errors. This method follows Cameron et al. (2008), with null hypothesis imposed, weights -1 and 1, and 1000 replications. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A1b: Differences across panel-survey drops and remaining individuals

| | surveyed individuals | panel drops | difference |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------|-------------|---|
| occupation | agriculture | 0.114 | -0.069*** (0.018) 0.002*** 0.006 (0.013) 0.722 0.026 (0.017) 0.148 0.027 (0.018) 0.148 -0.017 (0.036) 0.624 0.012 (0.009) 0.152 -0.001 (0.011) 0.942 0.015* (0.009) 0.058* |
| | public administration | 0.030 | 0.036 |
| | industry | 0.037 | 0.063 |
| | construction | 0.042 | 0.069 |
| | commerce | 0.264 | 0.247 |
| | transport | 0.004 | 0.017 |
| | education | 0.022 | 0.021 |
| | health | 0.007 | 0.022 |
| | household work | 0.254 | 0.198 |
| | unemployed | 0.183 | 0.214 |
| | expenditure/day (USD) | 5.156 | 5.182 |
| | land | 0.490 | 0.379 |
| | house | 0.569 | 0.469 |
| car | 0.039 | 0.044 | |
| cattle | 0.434 | 0.350 | |
| any property | 0.788 | 0.685 | |
| took a loan | 0.132 | 0.169 | |
| expenditure and property | | | 0.026 (0.176) 0.926 -0.112*** (0.042) 0.020** -0.101** (0.042) 0.048** 0.005 (0.014) 0.716 -0.084* (0.046) 0.084* -0.102** (0.045) 0.038** 0.037 (0.028) 0.150 |

Note: Standard errors of the difference reported in parentheses; these are corrected by clustering at the location (census area) level. Wild bootstrap p-values shown below the standard errors. This method follows Cameron et al. (2008), with null hypothesis imposed, weights -1 and 1, and 1000 replications. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A2: Regressions of main survey outcomes using multiple imputation

| dependent variable -----> | | vote-buying impact on voting | voting in conscience | vote-buying frequency | vote-buying by incumbent | vote-buying by challenger | vote price | turnout | voting for incumbent | voting for challenger |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------|------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| | | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| treatment | coefficient | -0.356*** | 0.246** | -0.167** | -0.052 | -0.079** | -4.193 | -0.054*** | 0.072* | -0.075** |
| effect | standard error | (0.089) | (0.099) | (0.081) | (0.043) | (0.039) | (11.831) | (0.019) | (0.043) | (0.038) |
| mean dep. variable (control) | | -0.054 | 0.049 | -0.028 | 0.610 | 0.623 | 81.652 | 0.930 | 0.621 | 0.307 |
| number of observations | | 1,275 | 1,275 | 1,275 | 1,275 | 1,275 | 1,275 | 1,275 | 1,275 | 1,275 |

Note: All regressions use multiple imputation by chained equations based on OLS. Imputation for each dependent or independent variable employs district dummies and individual controls only. 10 imputations are used. Dependent variables are z-scores (1-3), binary (4-5 and 7-9), and monetary value (6). All regressions regard level specifications. They include district dummies and individual controls. Individual controls are demographic characteristics (see Table 1), which include age, gender, household size, marital status dummies, education, number of children, nationality, ethnic group, and religion dummies, occupation dummies, expenditure, and property dummies. Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (census area) level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A3: The effect of electoral competition on vote-buying

| dependent variable -----> | | vote-buying frequency | vote-buying by incumbent | vote-buying by challenger | vote price |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------|
| | | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| electoral competition | coefficient | 0.189* | 0.118*** | 0.105*** | -13.383 |
| | standard error | (0.109) | (0.043) | (0.037) | (19.893) |
| | p-value wild bootstrap | 0.098* | 0.018** | 0.016** | 0.806 |
| urban | coefficient | 0.052 | -0.051 | -0.097** | -30.472 |
| | standard error | (0.117) | (0.055) | (0.048) | (34.186) |
| | p-value wild bootstrap | 0.760 | 0.542 | 0.394 | 0.840 |
| mean dep. variable (control) | | 0.002 | 0.618 | 0.631 | 82.323 |
| r-squared adjusted | | 0.037 | 0.050 | 0.047 | 0.014 |
| number of observations | | 983 | 962 | 962 | 472 |

Note: Electoral competition is based on the absolute of the difference between the scores of MDFM (FM's supporting party) and MLSTP+ADI (PT's supporting parties) at the parliamentary elections (location averages). Urban is binary. All regressions are OLS. Dependent variables are z-scores (1), binary (2-3), and monetary value (4). All regressions regard level specifications. They include district dummies, the treatment dummy, and individual controls. Individual controls are demographic characteristics (see Table 1), which include age, gender, household size, marital status dummies, education, number of children, nationality, ethnic group, and religion dummies, occupation dummies, expenditure, and property dummies. Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (census area) level. Wild bootstrap method follows Cameron et al. (2008), with null hypothesis imposed, weights -1 and 1, and 1000 replications. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A4: Treatment interacted with demographics: heterogeneous effects of the campaign

| dependent variable -----> | | vote-buying impact on voting | voting in conscience | vote-buying frequency | turnout | voting for incumbent | voting for challenger | |
|---------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|
| | | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| basic demographics | age | coefficient | 0.002 | -0.001 | 0.006 | -0.005** | -0.003 | -0.001 |
| | | standard error | (0.006) | (0.004) | (0.007) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.002) |
| | | p-value wild bootstrap | 0.776 | 0.720 | 0.418 | 0.030** | 0.406 | 0.558 |
| | schooling over primary level | coefficient | 0.009 | -0.318** | -0.121 | 0.124* | -0.002 | 0.098 |
| | | standard error | (0.177) | (0.156) | (0.173) | (0.067) | (0.092) | (0.072) |
| | | p-value wild bootstrap | 0.988 | 0.030** | 0.514 | 0.118 | 0.992 | 0.216 |
| ethnic group | angolar | coefficient | 0.458*** | -0.073 | 0.211 | 0.020 | 0.229 | -0.233 |
| | | standard error | (0.177) | (0.214) | (0.208) | (0.076) | (0.139) | (0.176) |
| | | p-value wild bootstrap | 0.030** | 0.738 | 0.332 | 0.786 | 0.350 | 0.452 |
| | tonga | coefficient | -0.149 | 0.532 | -0.446** | 0.048 | 0.210** | -0.168* |
| | | standard error | (0.270) | (0.340) | (0.204) | (0.108) | (0.107) | (0.095) |
| | | p-value wild bootstrap | 0.580 | 0.174 | 0.046** | 0.648 | 0.074* | 0.116 |
| occupation | commerce | coefficient | -0.421*** | 0.010 | -0.454*** | -0.029 | -0.044 | 0.006 |
| | | standard error | (0.120) | (0.180) | (0.168) | (0.037) | (0.060) | (0.059) |
| | | p-value wild bootstrap | 0.010*** | 0.958 | 0.032** | 0.446 | 0.470 | 0.900 |
| | public admin | coefficient | 0.824*** | 0.226 | 0.255 | 0.007 | -0.087 | 0.068 |
| | | standard error | (0.299) | (0.356) | (0.364) | (0.040) | (0.214) | (0.217) |
| | | p-value wild bootstrap | 0.040** | 0.564 | 0.572 | 0.834 | 0.710 | 0.776 |
| property | land | coefficient | 0.130 | -0.270* | 0.070 | -0.000 | -0.101 | 0.108 |
| | | standard error | (0.130) | (0.159) | (0.169) | (0.053) | (0.071) | (0.080) |
| | | p-value wild bootstrap | 0.332 | 0.120 | 0.676 | 0.992 | 0.232 | 0.246 |
| | house | coefficient | 0.224 | -0.416** | 0.244 | -0.004 | -0.069 | 0.059 |
| | | standard error | (0.138) | (0.169) | (0.174) | (0.066) | (0.099) | (0.083) |
| | | p-value wild bootstrap | 0.134 | 0.006*** | 0.216 | 0.918 | 0.526 | 0.496 |

Note: All regressions are OLS. Dependent variables are z-scores (1-3), and binary (4-6). Each coefficient corresponds to a different level specification of the indicated dependent variable on treatment, demographic variable of interest, and interaction of treatment with the demographic variable of interest (coefficient shown). In addition, all regressions include district dummies and individual controls. Individual controls are demographic characteristics (see Table 1), which include age, gender, household size, marital status dummies, education, number of children, nationality, ethnic group, and religion dummies, occupation dummies, expenditure, and property dummies. Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (census area) level. Wild bootstrap method follows Cameron et al. (2008), with null hypothesis imposed, weights -1 and 1, and 1000 replications. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A5: Correlations between vote-buying by the candidates (presidential elections) and the different parties (parliamentary elections)

| | | fm | pt | mdfm | mlstp | adi |
|------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|----------------|-------|-------|
| | | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| correlations | fm | 1.000 | | | | |
| | pt | 0.926 | 1.000 | | | |
| | mdfm | 0.762 | 0.792 | 1.000 | | |
| | mlstp | 0.618 | 0.699 | 0.930 | 1.000 | |
| | adi | 0.594 | 0.642 | 0.939 | 0.861 | 1.000 |
| partial effects | mdfm | coefficient | 0.153*** | 0.079 | | |
| | | standard error | (0.059) | (0.056) | | |
| | | p-value wild bootstrap | 0.012 | 0.154 | | |
| | mlstp | coefficient | 0.069 | 0.168** | | |
| | | standard error | (0.084) | (0.070) | | |
| | | p-value wild bootstrap | 0.454 | 0.016 | | |
| | adi | coefficient | 0.062 | 0.053 | | |
| | | standard error | (0.084) | (0.083) | | |
| | | p-value wild bootstrap | 0.542 | 0.592 | | |
| | mean dep. variable (control) | | 0.623 | 0.646 | | |
| r-squared adjusted | | 0.068 | 0.070 | | | |
| number of observations | | 973 | 973 | | | |

Note: Correlations are for control locations only. Partial effects come from OLS regressions of vote-buying by presidential candidate (fm or pt) during the presidential elections on vote-buying by the main parties (mdfm, mlstp, and adi) during the parliamentary elections (all binary variables), controlling for district dummies and treatment. Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (census area) level. Wild bootstrap method follows Cameron et al. (2008), with null hypothesis imposed, weights -1 and 1, and 1000 replications. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.